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	ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israel	i Reassessment		
	The cease-fire in Beir violations. The Israelis an West Beirut.			
	Only minor firing Beirut. According to t Israeli soldiers were w ambush near Alayh.	he Israeli milit	tary command, six	:
				:
	Stocks of Captured Weap	ons		
			the	2
	value of Syrian and Pal other military equipment Lebanon could reach seven Industry and Trade Mini of the captured equipment offset the cost of the incorporating a limited into its own inventories	t captured by the real billion do ster disclosed war. Israel has number of the	ne Israelis in llars. Israel's yesterday that some d abroad to help s already begun	
	Arab Summit Canceled			
	Tunisian President Summit that was schedul after failing to receive to convene a summit. On member states agreed un summit was generally we while most conservative	ed to begin tode the two-thirds only seven of the conditionally to be comed by radical conditionally to be comed by radical conditional co	ay in Tunisia s majority necessary e 22 Arab League o attend. The al Ara <u>b stat</u> es,	
	Nonaligned Communique			
	As many as 90 memb are to meet in Cyprus f the crisis in Lebanon,	for the next thre	ee days to discuss	
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Comment: The PLO probably will receive unanimous
and unconditional support at the conference. Although many moderates are not comfortable giving strong backing to the PLO they believe they must go along if they want Arab support on other iggues

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SPAIN-PORTUGAL-NATO: Talks on Alliance Commands	
//Spain's integration into <u>NATO threa</u> tens to complicate the debate over Alliance commands.//	25X1
Foreign Minister Pereira met with his Spanish counterpart last weekend in Madrid to discuss command relationships and other effects of Spanish entry. The Portuguese Foreign Ministry report- edly believes relations with Spain are heading for a difficult period as strife over NATO command issues spills over into other areas.//	25X1 25X1
//Lisbon is assuming Spain will not accept a subordinate command within the Iberian Atlantic Areacurrently under a Portuguese admiral—and is proposing an alternative new command for Spain. It would include some waters under Portuguese command and extending from Gibraltar to Spain's Canary Islands. Portugal would expect compensation through expansion of the Iberian Atlantic Command to include the Azores, now under US command.//	25X1
Comment: //Portugal's fears probably have been heightened by Spanish Defense Minister Oliart's announcement in June that Madrid intended to lobby in NATO for a fourth major command comprising peninsular Spain, Gibraltar, the Balearic and Canary Islands, and the Spanish enclaves in North Africa.//	25X1
//NATO, however, is unlikely to make fundamental changes in its command structure. The Spanish Navy is aware of this and probably would accept an arrangement similar to the Portuguese proposal so long as Portugal did not receive more responsibilities in the Atlantic than the capabilities of its Navy warranted. The other services, however, may resist such a compromise.//	25X1
//Greece, Turkey, Italy, and France also are concerned about the effect of Spain's membership on NATO commands in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Turkey's NATO representative, for example, recently linked Ankara's approval of any new arrangements resulting from Spain's accession to future decisions regarding Greek and Turkish command relationships in the Aegean.//	25X1
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SPAIN: Center Democrats Elect a President
The election on Tuesday of Landelino Lavilla as president of the governing Center Democratic Union is not likely to unify the party.
Only 144 of the 260 members of the party's Political Council voted for Lavilla. After the election, Lavilla claimed that he had received full powers to remodel the cabinet, negotiate electoral alliances with other parties, and determine who serves in the key posts and committees that shape party policy and review candidates for office.
Comment: The election reflects the poor state of party unity, and Lavilla's extensive powers may not enable him to prevent further defections. His willingness to consider allying with the Socialists will trouble party conservatives, some of whom may soon switch to new Liberal and Christian Democratic parties.
After being passed over for the leadership post himself, former Prime Minister Suarez may try to launch a new party, but he probably would not be able to attract many followers. His aim would be to ally with the Socialists, who are likely to win the next election. Suarez, however, does not have enough influence with right-of-center power brokers to be useful to the Socialists.
Elections are widely rumored for November, and potential defectors may have little time to form new parties. By August, the threat of defections will begin to diminish, and Lavilla may be able to take stronger action despite his reputation for indecisiveness.

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GHANA: Prospects for a Coup	
Potential for a coup is increasing as discover the government's inability to stem economitain public order.	
afte power the regime's indecision on econom problems and resultant shortages of ess eroded its public support. Enlisted me Rawlings's base of supportalso are in impatient with the lack of economic prowho are harassed and intimidated by the cannot control their troops.//	ential goods has nhead of state creasingly gress. Officers,
The murder of several high-ranking cials earlier this month is widely beli work of radicals in the regime. The re of fear has prompted several politicall Ghanaians, including some in the adminion leaving the country.	eved to be the sulting climate y prominent
Comment: Rawlings's opponents hav to agree on common goals and timing, an further hampered by a lack of funds and Moreover, no effective leader has emerg If the obstacles could be overcome, how tempt probably would face little opposidemoralized and disorganized security a	d they have been organization. ed to unite them. ever, a coup at-tion from the

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CHINA-US: Attacks on Supporters of Tair	wan
The Chinese media have increased the those in the US urging close ties with the focused on recent statements by several transfer.	Taiwan and have
focused on recent statements by conserve the US urging President Reagan to mainta for Taiwan. According to a commentary	ain US support
Daily, these groups seek a "two-Chinas" mo scruples about destroying Sino-US re	policy and have
pletely."	
Comment: The tone and arguments of cism are unchanged from previous Chinese These attacks are yet another warning the	e commentary.
sale of arms to Taiwan would damage US-0	Chinese relations.
TURKEY: Cabinet Resignations	
Deputy Prime Minister Ozal, the arc economic recovery as well as the Finance	chitect of Turkey's e and Housing
Ministers, relinquished their posts yest	cerday.
Comment: Ozal's position had becoming the financial collapse three weeks a	lgo of a major
brokerage firm. This set off a temporar banking community and rekindled criticis	sm of Ozal's
market-oriented austerity program. The ship probably will stick with Ozal's pro	grams because
they have stabilized the economy and remaining Western donors. His resignation,	the first major
change in the civilian cabinet, could retion of the government's tight money polin Ozal's plan to restructure the large	icy and a delay
the economy.	state sector or

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS		
LEBANON: The PLO in Beirut		
Most key PLO leaders and at leader in Beirut. The fighting forces organized along conventional military are more loosely organized. The PLO variety of individual and crew-served antiaircraft weapons, and rocket laws	of the larger PLO groups are y lines. The smaller groups forces have a few tanks and a d weapon <u>s, incl</u> uding artillery,	25 25
The PLO is an umbrella ore fedayeenor guerrillagroups is the largest, but he exercise over the others. His influence personal prestige and political trol of Fatah's superior militations.	es only nominal control e stems as much from his l skills as from his con-	2!
//At least three of Arafacare with him. They include has used to head the terrorist Black the more moderate Khalid Wazir as well as military tactics for rights; and key adviser Hani Hatiated settlement of the Pales	ck September organization; , who supports political r gaining Palestinian assan, who favor <u>s a nego-</u>	2
Leaders of the Other PLO Groups	5	
//Apart from Arafat's Fata veteran Palestinian leaders are Beirut deliberations over PLO s heads the Marxist Popular From Palestine, which is committed tive regimes as well as destroy the latter.//	e actively involved in strategy. George Habbash t for the Liberation of to overthrowing conserva-	2
//Nayif Hawatmah heads the Liberation of Palestine, which militant than the PFLP and gene over the armed struggle. Hawathe "Soviets' man" in the PLO, weak response to the PLO's trop Moscow may have suffered.//	erally favors the political tmah has been considered but in view of Moscow's	2
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//The second-largest PLO group, Saiqa, is controlled by Syria. About half its forces are thought to be in West Beirut along with some senior commanders. The political leadership probably is in Damascus. Other small groups that are likely to have some fighters in Beirut include two Iraqi-sponsored groups, one that follows a pro-Iraqi line, and another with close ties to Libya.//
//Although the various leaders have shown remarkable unity in the current crisis, each would have to approve any agreement. Arafat has wide authority to negotiate on behalf of the PLO, but the support he now commands could evaporate if he were to negotiate a settlement unacceptable to the others.//
Military Forces
//PLO ground forces have never been a single military force. Member groups have their own armed contingents of varying size and effectiveness, generally operating independently of each other.//
//In addition, there are two separate Palestine Liberation Army organizations. One, responsive to the PLO and Fatah, was located primarily in southern Lebanon. The other is controlled by Siria and is stationed in West Beirut.//
There probably are between 5,000 and 6,000 regular fighters from the PLO groups in West Beirut. Most were stationed there before the invasion, but perhaps as many as 1,000 managed to retreat from southern Lebanon after the onslaught began. Reports of up to 8,000 fighters in West Beirut may reflect the arming of noncombatants or local recruiting from among Palestinian civilians.
In addition to the Palestinians, there are other armed groups in West Beirut, some of which would resist an Israeli move into the sector. Lebanese Muslim militias of various persuasions probably have between 1,500 and 2,000 troops. Syrian regulars number between 600 and 1,000, and the Syrian-controlled PLA between 2,000 and 3,000.

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It is not known how much heavy equipment the Palestinians have been able to move into West Beirut. They almost certainly have more than an adequate supply of individual weapons and ammunition. The Palestinians have for years been building a large stockpile of arms in Beirut, probably similar to the huge caches the Israelis have found in southern Lebanon.

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